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THOMAS D. ROWE, JR.*
Well over half the states now have civil rules closely patterned af-
ter the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,I and movement toward adop-
tion of federal-model rules continues in at least some of the other
states.2 Moreover, even the state civil rules that do not track the Fed-
eral Rules as a whole make considerable use of federal language.3 The
resulting uniformity can be quite useful to practitioners and judges,4
and it is not my purpose to question the wisdom of the states in follow-
ing the federal lead.
The Federal Rules, however, are in many respects tailored to the
federal judicial system. The states need not follow blindly when the
reasons affecting the inclusion, exclusion, or interpretation of a provi-
sion do not coincide in the state and federal systems. Sometimes the
uniquely federal nature of a rule hits the legally knowledgeable reader
in the face, as with the special provision in Rule 14(c) for third-party
claims in the exclusive admiralty jurisdiction of the federal courts.5
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THE FOLLOWING CITATIONS WILL BE USED IN THIS ARTICLE:
R. FIELD, V. McKusICK & L. WROTH, MAINE CIVIL PRACTICE (2d ed. 1970) [hereinafter
cited as R. FIELD];
MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE (2d ed. 1979) [hereinafter cited as MOORE'S].
I. See C. WRIGHT & F. ELLIOTT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: INTERIM PAM-
PHLET TO JURISDICTION AND RELATED MATTERS §§ 9-9.53 (1977).
2. See, e.g., ARK. R. CIv. P. (effective July 1, 1979).
3. See, e.g., TEx. R. CIv. P. 39 (necessary party joinder, following FED. R. Civ. P. 19 with
minor changes).
4. Uniformity is valuable not only because it requires learning just one basic set of rules.
Identical language also allows those working with state rules to draw on precedents from the
federal system and other states. See, e.g., C. WRIGHT & F. ELLIO T, supra note 1, § 9, at 33;
Herrmann, The New Rules of Procedure in Delaware, 18 F.R.D. 327, 328 (1956) ("The drafters of
the Delaware Rules followed the policy of adopting Federal Rules verbatim, wherever possible, so
as to avoid deviation from Federal interpretations"). Moreover, "the federal rules ... embody an
interlocking scheme of procedure, and any change in one rule may adversely affect the application
or interpretation of other rules." Clay, May the Federal Civil Rules be Successfully Adopted to
Improve State Procedure? The Kentucky Experience, 24 F.R.D. 437, 439 (1960).
5. See 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1) (1976) ("The district courts shall have original jurisdiction, ex-
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State rulesmakers have almost universally caught the obvious inappli-
cability of such federal-only sections and omitted them from the coun-
terpart state rules.6
The federalist influence on the Federal Rules, though, can appear
in other ways, and at times it may be so subtle as to escape the attention
of the drafters of state rules. A draftsman may be quite aware of a
federalist nuance, of course, and still choose to make the state rule a
carbon copy of its federal model. Uniformity might, for example, be so
highly valued as to outweigh the possible reasons for departing from
the federal phrasing.7 It seems best, however, for the state rulesmakers
to make these decisions with full awareness of their implications rather
than by default and in ignorance of the sometimes exclusively federalist
considerations that influenced their federal counterparts.
At other times, the federalist influence may be apparent enough,
yet policy considerations independent of any uniquely federal goals
may support the same or a similar approach.' In such situations, there
can be a danger that state rulesmakers will perceive only the federal
factor and diverge from the federal phrasing, though a fuller under-
standing of the rationales for a Federal Rule might lead to its adoption
in order to further the independent purpose also served by the federal
approach.
The purpose of this short Comment is to call attention to the gen-
eral problem of the federalist overtones in some of the Federal Rules
and to offer some concrete illustrations in different areas of civil prac-
tice.9 My aim is neither to derail the practice of tracking the Federal
clusive of the courts of the States, of: (1) Any civil case of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction");
FED. R. Civ. P. 14(c).
6. But see UTAH R. Civ. P. 23.1 ("In a derivative action. . . the complaint. . . shall allege
(2) that the action is not a collusive one to confer jurisdiction on a court of the United States
which it would not otherwise have").
7. See, e.g., Frank, Arizona and the Federal Rules, 41 F.R.D. 79, 86 (1967):
[Tlhe 1966 amendment of [Federal] Rule 19, considerably altering the language of the
rule on indispensable parties, and a certain portion of Rule 23 on class actions was [sic]
highly objectionable to Arizona whose committee unanimously voted to oppose each of
these changes in the federal rules ...
We were thus brought up to the precise difficult point: would we rather be uniform
than right? The issue was comprehensively debated within the procedure committee...
and the almost unanimous conclusion was reached that we preferred uniformity to hav-
ing our own way even about our own rules. We adopted Rule 19 and the Rule 23
changes because, more than anything else, we want one procedural system.
8. See text accompanying notes 51-64 infra (possible functional, nonfederal reasons, in ad-
dition to reasons applicable only in federal system, for requiring derivative action plaintiff to have
been stockholder at time of complained-of conduct, and requiring movant for judgment notwith-
standing verdict to have sought directed verdict before jury's retirement).
9. There are additional problems in the adaptation of the Federal Rules to state practice
that this Comment does not address, such as the possibility of retaining an established state prac-
tice congenial to the local bar but simply not preferred by the federal rulesmakers for the federal
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Rules nor to imply that there are always subtle or "hidden" reasons for
state rules to follow the federal model. It is, rather, simply to facilitate
closer attention to the twin dangers of uncritical uniformity and unin-
formed variation so that the states' rules can best serve the states' needs.
I. STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS: TOLLING OF STATUTES BY
"COMMENCING" AN ACTION UNDER RULE 3, AND
RELATION BACK OF AMENDMENTS CHANGING
PARTIES UNDER RULE 15(c)
The event that determines whether an action is barred under a
statute of limitations varies from state to state; the main benchmarks
are filing a complaint with the court, issuing process, delivering process
to the official responsible for service, and serving process on the de-
fendant.'" As long as the states differ in their approaches, it may be
impossible for the Federal Rules to be at once uniform and fully satis-
factory in their approach to this subject. A state's focus on service as
the key event serves a concern for repose, enabling a prospective de-
fendant to close his books on a possible source of litigation unless his
potential adversary has actually tracked him down within the statutory
period."l Permitting something short of completed service to suffice, on
the other hand, tempers the arbitrariness of statutes of limitations and
withholds the reward of the statutory cutoff from the defendant who
manages to be unavailable for service in the closing days of the limita-
tions period.
The use of any particular approach in all state law cases in federal
court could conflict with the policies served in states following different
approaches. If the Federal Rules looked to the filing of an action to toll
the statute, a federal court plaintiff might keep alive a claim that the
courts. See generally, e.g., Deinard, The Adjustment of the Scheme of the Federal Rules to the
Peculiarities of Minnesota Practice, 36 MINN. L. REv. 695 (1952). The focus here is on federalist
influences on the Federal Rules-forced omissions or inclusions of particular approaches, differ-
ent workings of the same device in the courts of the two systems, different interpretations of the
same language, etc.-and not on all possible changes needed to adapt the federal model to state
practice.
10. See generally Annot., 27 A.L.R.2d 236 (1953 & Later Case Service (1970 & Supp. 1979)).
States not focusing on completed service often require good faith efforts at service for a plaintiff to
take advantage of an earlier event to toll the statute, see id., or permit filing to suffice only if
service is perfected within a specified period thereafter, see, e.g., OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2305.17
(Page Supp. 1978) (one year).
11. See, e.g., Committee Comment to Michigan Revised Judicature Act § 5856, reprinted in
34 MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. 944 (1968) ("The defendant has a vital interest in being informed of
the pendency of an action against him"); cf Marshall v. Mulrenin, 508 F.2d 39, 42-43 (Ist Cir.
1974) ("the Massachusetts legislature felt it so important that [the executor or administrator of an
estate] be free to make distributions at the earliest possible moment, that it afforded him the
protection of affirmative personal notice within the year during which suit must be commenced").
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state courts would dismiss as stale for want of actual notice to the de-
fendant.1 2 If the Federal Rules focused on service, however, the re-
quirements for a state law claim in federal court might be stiffer than
those the state had chosen. 3 Yet the Federal Rules cannot totally duck
the problem, lest there be no guidance for federal courts handlingfed-
eral law cases.' 4
The federal rulesmakers' response to this dilemma was a rather
exquisite piece of waffling. Rule 3 provides: "A civil action is com-
menced by filing a complaint with the court." That language might
sound as if it adopts the filing-is-tolling approach; but the original Ad-
visory Committee recognized, and took no position on, the key ques-
tion whether under the rule "the mere filing of the complaint stops the
running of the statute, or whether any further step is required, such as,
service of the summons and complaint or their delivery to the marshal
for service."'"
The complexities that make the Federal Rule's equivocation un-
derstandable need not generally trouble the states. Either in their
counterparts to Federal Rule 3 or in legislation, they can settle on a
clear, uniform approach for deciding what event tolls the running of
the limitations period. Indeed, tracking the Federal Rule can create
doubt whether "commencing" an action by filing will suffice to avoid a
time bar. 16 Rulesmakers in many states have recognized such consider-
ations and have adapted the federal language to suit local policies,'
7
12. See Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530 (1949) (under former
Kansas provision interpreted as requiring service within limitations period, state law action in
federal court must be dismissed when service not effected until after running of statute, even
though "commenced" by filing within period).
13. Cf Marshall v. Mulrenin, 508 F.2d at 44-45 (liberal state provision on relation back of
amendments changing parties requires federal court in state law case to allow relation back even
though requirements of Federal Rule 15(c) not satisfied).
14. See generally 2 MOORE'S 3.07[4.-3-2]-[6].
15. Notes of Advisory Committee, reprintedin 28 U.S.C. app., at 394-95 (1976). Though the
significance of an action's being "commenced" is most commonly its effect on the time bar of a
limitations provision, it can make a difference for other purposes as well. See, e.g., United States
v. Agnew, 80 F.R.D. 506 (S.D. Fla. 1978) ("commencement" of action by filing complaint permits
use of discovery-to try to learn defendant's whereabouts-though defendant not served with
process); 2 MOORE'S 3.02[2] (listing other matters upon which time of "commencement" bears).
16. Compare Committee Notes to MICH. GEN. CT. RULE 101, reprintedin I J. HONIGMAN &
C. HAWKINS, MICHIGAN COURT RULES ANNOTATED 33 (2d ed. 1962) ("This section [which tracks
Federal Rule 3] will not affect the statutes of limitation"), with Buscaino v. Rhodes, 385 Mich. 474,
189 N.W.2d 202 (1971) (repudiating Committee's position and holding Rule 101 to mean action
"commenced" for purposes of statutes of limitations by filing of complaint).
17. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-203 (1976) ("A civil action is commenced by filing a
petition with the clerk of the court, provided service of process is obtained ... within ninety (90)
days after the petition is filed; otherwise the action is deemed commenced at the time of service of
process"). Another approach is for a state to regard its Rule 3 counterpart as treating only the
manner, as opposed to the time, of commencement and to address the latter question separately by
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'but others have followed the federal phrasing with no apparent indica-
tion whether their product is meant to address the issue or not.' s At the
least, state drafters should consider whether they have the authority to
determine policy in this area or whether they must leave the problem to
the legislature. Those with authority to make policy, or able simply to
codify existing policy, would do well to consider being more precise
than the federal rulesmakers in their language and more explicit about
the import of the state rule.
A closely related problem arises when complaints are amended to
change defendants. Whether such amendments relate back to the date
of the original pleading can be crucial when the original pleading satis-
fied limitations requirements but the amendment is offered too late to
allow a completely new filing. Logically, a filing-is-tolling state could
let good faith party-change amendments relate back, since even a prop-
erly named defendant in such a state might not receive service and no-
tice until well after the limitations period had run. 9 A service-is-
tolling state, on the other hand, would presumably insist that the de-
fendant to be added have knowledge of the complaint within the limi-
tations period, since if properly named from the beginning he should
have had notice before the statutory cutoff date. Again, for the same
reasons that apply in connection with Rule 3, it does not seem possible
for the federal rulesmakers to please everybody.
By a 1966 amendment to Rule 15(c), however, the federal drafters
did take what seemed to be a clear position in favor of requiring notice
within the limitations period:
An amendment changing the party against whom a claim is asserted
relates back if [the claim or defense asserted in the amended pleading
arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or at-
tempted to be set forth in the original pleading] and, within the pe-
riod provided by law for commencing the action against him, the
party to be brought in by amendment (1) has received such notice of
the institution of the action that he will not be prejudiced in main-
taining his defense on the merits, and (2) knew or should have
known that, but for a mistake concerning the identity of the proper
party, the action would have been brought against him.
If read as requiring notice before the statutory period runs out, this
phrasing avoids conflict with the policy of those states requiring service
legislation. See, e.g., ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 553 (West Cum. Supp. 1978-79); 1 R. FIELD
§ 3.2, at 15 (Supp. 1977).
18. See, e.g., ARIz. R. Cir. P. 3.
19. See, e.g., MAss. R. Civ. P. 15(c) ("Whenever the claim or defense asserted in the
amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be
set forth in the original pleading, the amendment (including an amendment changing a party)
relates back to the original pleading").
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within the limitations period, thus making unnecessary a decision
whether the federal or state rule should prevail. The language conflicts,
however, with the policies of states following a more liberal approach
to party-change amendments.20
The response of the federal courts to these complexities has com-
pounded the problem. The First Circuit, still smarting from its reversal
by the Supreme Court in Hanna v. Plumer,2 1 has held the Federal Rule
inapplicable when it would forbid relation back permitted by a more
liberal Massachusetts rule. 2 The Third Circuit, agreeing with the First
and others23 that Federal Rule 15(c) requires notice before the expira-
tion of the statutory period, has held that the Federal Rule prevails
over New Jersey's liberal policy on relation back in cases involving
complaints originally naming "John Doe" defendants.24 The Second
Circuit has avoided the clash by interpreting Rule 15(c)'s requirement
that the party to be added by amendment must receive notice "within
the period provided by law for commencing the action against him" to
extend the time for notice beyond the limitations period itself, taking in
any period after the required filing date that state law allows for serv-
ice.25
This combination of uncertainty in interpretation and possible
conflict with state policies makes the federal phrasing of dubious value
to the states. Nonetheless, the 1966 amendment to Rule 15(c) has been
widely incorporated into state rules, even in states that espouse the
liberal filing-is-tolling approach.26 The state rulesmakers apparently
have not realized that the federal language, if strictly interpreted, sub-
verts their liberal policy by requiring that notice be given to a wrongly
20. Cf. Marshall v. Mulrenin, 508 F.2d 39, 44 (Ist Cir. 1974) ("Paradoxically, [Federal] Rule
15[(c)] seems, basically, drawn to avoid a substantive effect so far as statutes of limitations are
concerned," yet because of greater liberality of Massachusetts provision, "there is in fact a true
conflict between the federal amendment of parties rule and the Massachusetts statute").
21. 380 U.S. 460 (1965) (substituted service permitted by Federal Rule 4 suffices despite per-
sonal service requirement of Massachusetts law); see Marshall v. Mulrenin, 508 F.2d at 43 ("we
can only think the [Supreme] Court misread the [Massachusetts] statute" at issue in Hanna).
22. Marshall v. Mulrenin, 508 F.2d at 45.
23. See, e.g., Simmons v. Fenton, 480 F.2d 133 (7th Cir. 1973); Archuleta v. Duffy's, Inc., 471
F.2d 33, 35 (10th Cir. 1973).
24. See Britt v. Arvanitis, 590 F.2d 57, 60-62 (3d Cir. 1978).
25. See Ingram v. Kumar, 585 F.2d 566, 571 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 1289
(1979).
26. Compare, e.g., ME. R. Civ. P. 15(c) with ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 553 (West Cum.
Supp. 1978-79). See I R. FIELD § 15.6, at 305-06 (noting general problem and arguing against
strict interpretation). For an exception to the usual pattern, modifying the federal phrasing to
accord with liberal state practice, see MAss. R Civ. P. 15(c), which is quoted in note 19 supra.
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named defendant earlier than to one correctly designated.27
Taken together, Federal Rules 3 and 15(c) seem inappropriate for
virtually any state, whatever approaches it wishes to take to tolling of
limitations and relation back. The most obvious readings of the federal
language are that commencing is filing is tolling, and that to allow rela-
tion back of party-change amendments, the party to be added must
have received notice within the statutory period without any of the ex-
tensions for service of process that may be allowed in cases of proper
initial naming. Such readings produce an inconsistent policy permit-
ting extensions of time for initial service but not for relation back; yet
the two situations do not seem materially different. To avoid these dif-
ficulties, a state supreme court would have to perform considerable
plastic surgery to bring fully borrowed rules into line with a state's poli-
cies. Such state interpretations would probably have to differ at least in
part from prevailing federal interpretations, thus sacrificing some of the
benefits of textual uniformity.28 It is no criticism of the federal rules-
makers to conclude that pressures unique to the federal courts have led
to rules somewhat ambiguous in phrasing and subject to conflicting in-
terpretations. A state, however, would do well to consider whether it is
worthwhile to incorporate these same problems--or if it should seek
phrasings that are more precise and better tailored to whatever policies
the state wishes to follow.
II. RULE 14(a) IMPLEADER
Federal Rule 14(a) has always allowed a defendant to implead a
third party who, as the rule now reads, "is or may be liable to him for
all or part of the plaintiff's claim against him." The purpose of the rule
is to permit economical settlement of claims for indemnity, such as
those of an insured against his insurer, in the same proceeding that
settles the primary liability and damages issues. The device is available
in most state court systems; but even if the state rules differ, requiring a
separate suit on the indemnity claim, the state's divergence from Fed-
27. See Note, Federal Rule of Civil.Procedure 15(c): Relation Back ofAmendments, 57 MINN.
L. REv. 83, 103 (1972):
Usually an action in [filing-is-tolling] states against a defendant will be timely com-
menced by filing even though he does not have notice of the institution of the suit until
after the limitation period has elapsed. However, Rule 15(c) requires that the proposed
defendant [le., the correct defendant mistakenly not named in the original complaint]
receive notice within the limitations period, even though in any given case the defendant
[even if properly named from the beginning] might not receive notice until after the
expiration of the limitations period.
28. See, e.g., Britt v. Arvanitis, 590 F.2d 57, 60-61 (3d Cir. 1978) (noting differing Third
Circuit and New Jersey Supreme Court interpretations of identical language on relation back of
amendments changing parties in Federal Rule 15(c) and New Jersey Rule 4:9-3).
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eral Rule 14(a)'s provision for impleader creates no significant difficul-
ties for the federal courts. The Federal Rule merely accelerates the
indemnity determination without affecting the substantive law gov-
erning the claim. 9 There are, however, aspects of interpleader proce-
dure that would raise unique problems in the federal ourts if
incorporated into the Federal Rule. Consequently, the states can feel
less constrained than the federal rulesmakers in certain respects.
A. Impleader of Third-Party Defendant Allegedly Liable Directly to
Plaintiffi
As originally promulgated, Federal Rule 14(a) not only provided
for impleader of parties who might be derivatively liable to the defend-
ant if he were held liable on the plaintiffs claim, but also allowed the
defendant to join a third-party defendant-such as a joint tortfeasor-
who might be directly liable to the plaintiff on his claim against the
defendant.30 The rule was amended in 1946, effective in 1948, to elimi-
nate this direct liability impleader and leave only the present derivative
liability provision.3 There were two main types of difficulty with di-
rect liability impleader, but the reasons for its inappropriateness in the
federal system need not apply to the states. First, the prevailing view
was that under the complete diversity rule of Strawbridge v. Curtiss,32
which does not govern the state courts, a plaintiff could not, without
independent jurisdictional grounds, proceed against a third-party de-
fendant who shared state citizenship with the plaintiff3 3 Second, fed-
eral direct liability impleader ran into a dilemma in state law cases
when state law made no provision for contribution among joint
tortfeasors. If direct liability impleader put the third party's liability to
the plaintiff in issue whether the plaintiff had sought to do so or not, the
original defendant might be given a right of contribution not available
under state law. Such an effect would raise problems under the Rules
Enabling Act, which forbids the Federal Rules to "abridge, enlarge or
modify any substantive right." 34 To avoid this difficulty, most of the
federal courts that faced the issue interpreted the rule to mean that the
plaintiff had no obligation to proceed against the new party.35 This
29. See, e.g., Jeub v. B/G Foods, Inc., 2 F.R.D. 238 (D. Minn. 1942); 3 MOORE'S 14.031].
30. See 3 MOORE'S 114.01[1.-1], at 14-38.
31. Id.
32. 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806) (for federal diversity jurisdiction, all plaintiffs must be of
different state citizenship from all defendants).
33. See Notes of Advisory Committee on 1946 Amendment to Rules, reprinted in 28 U.S.C.
app., at 414 (1976).
34. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1976); see 3 MooRE's 14.15, at 14-371 to -372.
35. See Notes of Advisory Committee on 1946 Amendment, supra note 33, at 414.
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approach, however, reduced direct liability impleader to "a mere offer
of a party to the plaintiff,"3 6 eliminating the practical effect of the rule.
The states, by contrast, are free to decide whether they wish to
allow one potential defendant to force the joinder of others through
direct liability impleader. Some have done so, with language either
identical in phrasing or equivalent in effect to the pre-1948 Federal
Rule.37 Other states should at least consider the possibility that the
federal language took its present form for reasons that do not bind the
states-and that it may not coincide completely with what they want to
accomplish.
B. Compulsory Claims by Plaintiffs Against Third-Party Defendants.
The same sorts of problems would arise if Federal Rule 14(a) in-
corporated the approach adopted in some states on compulsory claims
against impleaded defendants. The Federal Rule provides that after
impleader of the third-party defendant, "[t]he plaintiff may assert any
claim against the third-party defendant arising out of the transaction or
occurrence that is the subject matter of the plaintiffs claim against the
third-party plaintiff. .. ." This provision is entirely permissive, but
some states' counterpart rules make it compulsory by adding, "and his
failure to do so shall have the effect of the failure to state a claim in a
pleading under Rule 13(a)."' 38 Rule 13(a) governs compulsory counter-
claims; under it, a defendant's related courterclaim is normally pre-
cluded if not raised in the same suit.39
Any similar federal rule is barred by the application of the Straw-
bridge complete diversity rule, which requires an independent basis of
federal jurisdiction over a diversity plaintiffs claim against a nondi-
verse third-party defendant.4" If federal jurisdictional limits sometimes
make it impossible for the plaintiff to join his claim, the Rules can
hardly hold it against him if he fails to do so. In addition, a federal
provision making such claims compulsory would run the risk of collid-
ing with state substantive law allowing plaintiffs to proceed against
joint tortfeasors individually. In states where the substantive law per-
36. Id.
37. See, e.g., PA. R. Civ. P. 2252(a) (defendant may join anyone "who may be alone liable or
liable over to him" on the plaintiffs claim "or jointly or severally liable thereon with him"); TEx.
R. Civ. P. 38 (defendant may implead nonparty "who is or may be liable to him or to theplainti(y
for all or part of the plaintiffs claim against" him) (emphasis added; italicized phrase identical to
language of pre-1948 federal provision).
38. ALA. R. Civ. P. 14(a); ME. R. Civ. P. 14(a); VT. R. Civ. P. 14(a).
39. See, e.g., Reporter's Notes to ME. R. Civ. P. 13, reprinted in 1 R. FIELD 261; Reporter's
Notes to VT. R. Civ. P. 13, reprinted in Rules Volume, VT. STAT. ANN. 51 (1971).
40. See Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365 (1978).
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mits, however, the rulesmakers are free to respond to the concern ex-
pressed by the reporter for the Maine Rules of Civil Procedure: "It
seems an unfair burden upon the [third-party defendant] not to require
the plaintiff to clean up in a single action the entire controversy arising
out of a single transaction or occurrence."
4 1
III. AGGREGATION OF CLAIMS FOR JURISDICTIONAL AMOUNT
PURPOSES IN CLASS ACTIONS
In Snyder v. Harris,42 the Supreme Court held that class action
plaintiffs may not generally aggregate their claims to satisfy the mini-
mum amount in controversy requirement for federal jurisdiction.43
One of the reasons for the decison-and perhaps the most persuasive
one-relates to a problem unique to federal diversity jurisdiction. In a
diversity class action, only the citizenship of the named representatives
counts; shared citizenship between unnamed class members and an ad-
verse party does not destroy complete diversity.' If small claimants
could pool their claims to satisfy the jurisdictional amount require-
ment, they could bring an essentially local controversy within federal
jurisdiction by naming an out-of-stater as the class representative. 45
Thus, the class action rule46 would create federal jurisdiction in this
situation: without the rule no member of the plaintiff class-even the
out-of-staters-would qualify for federal jurisdiction because of the
smallness of his claim. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, however,
are not intended "to extend . . . the jurisdiction of the United States
"147district courts ....
Some state courts also have amount in controversy requirements
for their jurisdiction, normally to determine whether a case belongs in a
superior or an inferior state court.48 Because the subject matter juris-
diction of the state courts does not depend on the citizenship of the
parties, however, and because there is no reason for concern about
bringing an essentially local controversy within the jurisdiction of a lo-
cal court, the rationale for the Snyder holding does not apply to state
41. Reporter's Notes to ME. R. Civ. P. 14, reprinted in 1 R. FIELD 287.
42. 394 U.S. 332 (1969).
43. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331(a), 1332(a) (1976) (civil actions in which "the matter in contro-
versy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000, exclusive of interest and costs" in general federal
question and diversity jurisdiction).
44. Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. at 340.
45. See id.
46. FED. R. CIv. P. 23.
47. FED. R. Civ. P. 82.
48. See, e.g., ARIz. CONsT. art. 6, § 14, cl. 3 (original superior court jurisdiction of certain
civil cases when amount in controversy is $1,000 or more).
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courts. In at least two opinions, though, state judges have shown a wil-
lingness to follow the Snyder rule, apparently without considering
whether it really makes sense except on the federal level.49
Fortunately, other state court treatments of the applicability of
Snyder have perceived the federalist influence behind its holding and
reached independent conclusions on its suitability at the state level. In
particular, the Arizona Supreme Court noted that forbidding aggrega-
tion could effectively eliminate any forum for class actions involving
multiple small claims, since inferior state courts are practically, or per-
haps even legally, incompetent to handle such complex proceedings. 50
However great the benefits of uniformity of interpretation generally,
the aggregation problem demonstrates that state courts in arriving at
interpretations under their rules, like state rulesmakers in settling on
phrasings for the rules, should be alert for situations in which the fed-
eral interpretation is inappropriate for state purposes. In such cases
state judges should strike off on their own.
IV. PREREQUISITES FOR STOCKHOLDER DERIVATIVE ACTIONS
Federal Rule 23.1(1) requires that a complaint in a shareholder's
derivative action allege "that the plaintiff was a shareholder or member
at the time of the transaction of which he complains or that his share or
membership thereafter devolved on him by operation of law." One
function of the rule is to prevent the purchase and sale of federal diver-
sity jurisdiction; without the requirement, transferring a share of a cor-
poration's stock to a diverse party after the alleged injury to the
corporation could permit suit in federal court.51 This possibility is of
no concern to state drafters in the framing of their counterpart rules,
and if the federal provision accomplished nothing more, there would be
no reason to consider including it in state rules.
The contemporaneous ownership requirement, though, does serve
another purpose: it keeps a prospective litigant not only from buying
federal jurisdiction but also from buying a lawsuit, period. The policy
served here is one against litigation based on events that took place
49. See Simmons v. Central Charge Serv., Inc., 269 A.2d 850, 852 n.5 (D.C. 1970) (relying on
Snyder to reject aggregation urged to escape exclusive jurisdiction of small claims court); Paley v.
Coca Cola Co., 389 Mich. 583, 602-03, 209 N.W.2d 232, 240-41 (1973) (Swainson, J., dissenting
from affirmance by equally divided court).
50. Judson School v. Wick, 108 Ariz. 176, 177, 494 P.2d 698, 699 (1972), notedin 15 ARIZ. L.
REv. 615 (1973); accord, Paley v. Coca Cola Co., 389 Mich. 583, 594-96, 209 N.W.2d 232, 236-37
(1973) (opinion supporting affirmance by equally divided court).
51. See 3B MOORE's 23.1.1512], at 23.1-15; 7A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRAC-
TICE AND PROCEDURE § 1828, at 341 (1972).
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when the plaintiff had no shareholder's stake in them.5" Whether that
policy is worth serving, however, is a question on which reasonable
states could differ. The federal requirement may prevent not only
purchased lawsuits but also actions brought by innocent purchasers
who suffer the effects of previous corporate conduct that comes to light
after their purchase.5 3 Some states' rulesmakers have left the contem-
poraneous ownership requirement out of their counterparts to Federal
Rule 23. 1,5 perhaps in some cases out of disapproval and in others on
the theory that the policy decision is not one that should be made by
rule. 5 Others, however, in omitting the requirement seem to have per-
ceived only the federalist problem and to have missed the independent
policy considerations, reversing the difficulty noted in previous sections
of overlooking the federalist influence. In these states, the drafters' per-
ception of the federal influence apparently blinded them to the gener-
ally applicable equitable basis for the requirement;56 state rulesmakers
aware of this independent reason for the rule might find it worth keep-
ing.
V. DIRECTED VERDICT MOTION AS PREREQUISITE TO MOTION FOR
JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING VERDICT
A complicated constitutional evolution57 led to the approach taken
in Federal Rule 50(b), under which a jury verdict loser must have
sought a directed verdict at the close of all the evidence in order to
52. See 3B MOORE'S 1 23.1.15[2], at 23.1-14 to -19; 7A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note
51, § 1828, at 341-42.
53. Cf. 7A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 51, § 1828, at 346-48 (split in federal courts
over whether allegation of continuing wrong satisfies contemporaneous ownership rule). For a
summary of decisions and rationales for permitting suit by later purchasers, see Annot., 148
A.L.R. 1090, 1094-97, 1099-100 (1944).
54. See, e.g., W. VA. R. Civ. P. 23(b); Wyo. R. Civ. P. 23.1.
55. See Reporter's Notes to ME. R. Civ. P. 23(b), reprinted in 1 R. FIELD 386. See also
Reporter's Notes to R.I. R. CIv. P. 23(b), reprinted in 2B R.I. GEN. LAWS 174 (1976) (noting
omission of "details with substantive overtones found in the Federal rule" and absence of Rhode
Island law on point).
56. See Advisory Committee's Note to 1967 Amendment to MONT. R. CIv. P. 23.1, reprinted
in 7 MONT. REV. CODEs ANN. 207 (Cum. Supp. 1977). The Committee explains the elimination
of federal language as an omission of allegations that "appear to be designed to prevent abuse of
federal jurisdiction and to be unnecessary in state practice." As to the provision of Federal Rule
23.1(2) requiring an allegation that the action is not a collusive one to fabricate federal jurisdic-
tion, the Committee is clearly correct; but as to the contemporaneous ownership requirement of
Rule 23.1(1), the explanation overlooks its possible substantive justification. See also I TEx. R.
Civ. P. at 221 (Vernon 1979) (noting elimination of derivative action provision based on former
Federal Rule 23(b) from TEx. R. CIrv. P. 42, and quoting Stayton, 4nalysis of Changes, 4 Tax. BJ.
667, 667 (1941), for the explanation that this provision "'was thought to apply to a jurisdictional
mischief applicable to the Federal courts and inapplicable to the Texas courts' ").
57. For a fuller account of the case law development, see 5A MOORE'S 1 50.07[1].
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move for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (n.o.v.). In brief, the
Supreme Court first ruled that judgment n.o.v was unconstitutional in
the federal courts,5 s but then held that the seventh amendment did per-
mit the reservation of a ruling on a directed verdict motion until after
return of the verdict. 9 Capitalizing on this loophole, the drafters of the
Federal Rules eliminated the necessity for actual reservations in indi-
vidual cases, providing that "[w]henever a motion for directed verdict
made at the close of all the evidence is denied or for any reason is not
granted, the court is deemed to have submitted the action to the jury
subject to a later determination of the legal questions raised by the mo-
tion."6 The result is a clear but fairly detailed set of requirements for
preserving the right to seek judgment n.o.v., and from time to time
counsel inevitably fall into the trap set by the rules' rigid demand.
Since the seventh amendment has never been held binding on the
states,6 ' they are free to avoid this trap for the unwary. Some states
have chosen to take advantage of this constitutional elbow room.62
They may have done so, however, at an unperceived cost, for-like the
contemporaneous ownership requirement-the Federal Rule's minuet
has independent functional value. As Professor Moore's treatise ex-
plains:
At the time that a motion for directed verdict is permitted, it remains
possible for the party against whom the motion is directed to cure the
defects in proof that might otherwise preclude him from taking the
case to the jury. A motion for judgment n.o.v., without prior notice
of alleged deficiencies of proof, comes too late for the possibility of
cure except by way of a complete new trial. The requirement of the
motion for directed verdict is thus in keeping with the spirit of the
rules to avoid tactical victories at the expense of substantive inter-
ests.6
3
58. See Slocum v. New York Life Ins. Co., 228 U.S. 364 (1913).
59. See Baltimore & Carolina Line, Inc. v. Redman, 295 U.S. 654 (1935).
60. FED. R. Civ. P. 50(b).
61. See Melancon v. McKeithen, 345 F. Supp. 1025 (E.D. La. 1972), affdmem, sub nom.
Davis v. Edwards, 409 U.S. 98 (1973), and Mayes v. Ellis, 409 U.S. 943 (1972), and Hill v. Mc-
Keithen, 409 U.S. 943 (1972) (all three affirming Melancon); Minneapolis & St. L.R.R. v. Bombo-
lis, 241 U.S. 211 (1916); THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: ANALYSIS
AND INTERPRETATION, S. Doc. No. 92-82, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 905-06 n.12 (1973).
62. See, e.g., IDAHO R. Civ. P. 50(b) ("Any party aggrieved by a verdict, whether or not he
has previously moved for a directed verdict, may move.., to have the verdict and any judgment
entered thereon set aside and to have judgment entered in accordance with his motion"); MINN.
R. CIV. P. 50.02(l) ("A party may move that judgment be entered notwithstanding the verdict or
notwithstanding the jury has disagreed and been discharged, whether or not he has moved for a
directed verdict"); OHIO R. CIv. P. 50(B) ("Whether or not a motion to direct a verdict has been
made or overruled ... a party may move to have the verdict and any judgment entered thereon
set aside and to have judgment entered in accordance with his motion").
63. 5A MOORE'S 50.08, at 50-88.
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In other words, the directed verdict motion prerequisite makes it neces-
sary for the moving party to point out any reparable gaps in his adver-
sary's proof in time for them to be filled. Consequently, abandoning
the requirement can substitute another sort of trap for the unwary: the
movant for judgment n.o.v. can lie low with his objection until his ad-
versary is no longer able to do anything about it, though with earlier
notice the opponent might have remedied the defect. There is no direct
indication that the state rulesmakers who decided to omit the federal
prerequisite considered it in a balanced light, taking into account both
its costs and benefits apart from the uniquely federal constitutional
problem that helped shape the present Federal Rule.64 Once again,
state drafters may have been all too aware of the federalism of a Fed-
eral Rule-to the exclusion of nonfederalist purposes it also serves.
VI. CONCLUSION
This brief survey does not purport to be exhaustive; no doubt there
are other instances of federalist influence on the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and varying responses in states adopting federal-model
rules.65 Nor do I claim to have isolated any single type of federalist
influence on the Federal Rules, nor to have described any dominant
pattern in the states' adaptation of those rules. At times the federalist
influence shows in the phrasing of a Federal Rule, as with Rule 3 on
"commencement" of an action. At other times it shows in the omission
of a provision that the states can more readily adopt, such as a defend-
ant's impleader of a third party who may be directly liable to the plain-
tiff. At still other times the effect is on decisional law under a rule, as in
the case of aggregation of claims in class actions.
As for the nature of the states' responses, there is little uniformity
beyond the nearly universal avoidance of slavish incorporation of
64. See Staff Note to OHIO R. Civ. P. 50(B), Civil Rules Volume, OHIO REv. CODE ANN. 20&
(Page 197 1) ("Ohio procedure under the new rule will not be burdened with the federal 'directed
verdict trap' as a condition for entertaining a motion for a judgment notwithstanding the ver-
dict"). See also 2 J. HETLAND & 0. ADAMSON, MINNESOTA PRACTICE 326-27 (1970) (noting
constitutionality of judgment n.o.v. in Minnesota and difference between Minnesota rules and
Federal Rules, without mentioning possible functional value of federal approach).
Idaho, by contrast, may have based its rejection of the federal approach on unsatisfactory
experience under the federal model, which it had followed for twenty years. Compare former
Idaho R. Civ. P. 50(b) (1958), Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure Volume, IDAHO CODE 307 (1958),
with IDAHO R. CIV. P. 50(b) (as amended 1978). I have not been able to find any commentary on
the change.
65. See, e.g., Reporter's Notes to ME. R. Civ. P. 50, reprinedin I R. FIELD 659-60 (Maine's
following of minority rule equating standards for new trial and directed verdict requires elimina-
tion of provisions in Federal Rule 50(b)-(c) for alternative rulings on judgment n.o.v. and new
trial motions).
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clearly inappropriate provisions. Some states have deliberately chosen
a high degree of congruence with the Federal Rules for convenience,
simplicity, and interchangeability of precedent, but some state rules-
makers have apparently followed the Federal Rules unquestioningly,
particularly with regard. to Rules 3 and 15(c) as they relate to statutes of
limitations. When the states do depart from the federal model, some
display great sensitivity to the reasons underlying the Federal Rules
and to why state approaches might well differ. Others, particularly
with respect to the contemporaneous ownership rule in stockholder de-
rivative actions and the directed verdict motion prerequisite to seeking
judgment n.o.v., may have overreacted to their correct perception of
federalist influence and missed the general value of the approaches fol-
lowed in the Federal Rules. To avoid both excessive tracking of and
questionable departures from federal phrasing, state rulesmakers must
consider carefully the thinking behind the Federal Rules, what they
accomplish, and whether that suits the state's purposes.
This Comment may, I hope, help state rulesmakers in this en-
deavor by providing several illustrations of federalist influence and
state responses, including some responses that seem very thoughtful
and others that appear less so. What could help even more is some-
thing that has been conspicuously lacking throughout the history of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: specific mention in federal Advisory
Committee Notes of the uniquely federal policies behind the ap-
proaches taken in some of the Federal Rules. State rulesmakers might
benefit greatly from such comments, as well as from an explanation of
generally applicable functional considerations when mixed with feder-
alist influences. The pattern of state adoption of both the general fed-
eral model and, often, of specific federal amendments is now
widespread and well established. The federal rulesmakers are in the
best position to recognize when concerns applicable to the federal sys-
tem, but less so or not at all in the states, influence their product; they
should recognize an obligation to provide the information that would
help the states make fully informed decisions on just how closely to
follow the federal model.
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